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CROSSING OVER: WHY ATTORNEYS (AND
JUDGES) SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CROSSEXAMINE WITNESSES REGARDING THEIR
IMMIGRATION STATUSES FOR IMPEACHMENT
PURPOSES
Colin Miller*

INTRODUCTION
You are sitting in an empty bar (in a town you’ve never before visited),
drinking a Bacardi with a soft-spoken acquaintance you barely know. After
an hour, a third individual walks into the tavern and sits by himself, and you
ask your acquaintance who the new man is. ―Be careful of that guy,‖ you
are told. ―He is a man with a past.‖ A few minutes later, a fourth person
enters the bar; he also sits alone. You ask your acquaintance who this new
individual is. ―Be careful of that guy, too,‖ he says. ―He is a man with no
past.‖ Which of these two people do you trust less?1
You are a juror sitting in a courtroom (a place you’ve never visited),
hearing an opening statement by a loud-mouthed lawyer you barely know.
After an hour, a first witness walks into the courtroom and sits by himself
on the witness stand. The lawyer’s cross-examination of the witness implies, ―Be careful of that guy. He is an illegal alien.‖ A few minutes later,
a second witness enters the courtroom; he also sits alone on the stand. The
lawyer’s cross-examination of the witness implies, ―Be careful of that guy.
He cheats on his wife.‖ Which of these two people do you trust less?
According to the recent opinion of one federal appellate court, the illegal alien is the answer, and the second line of interrogation is prohibited.
In United States v. Almeida-Perez,2 the Eighth Circuit found that an extensive interrogation into the immigration statuses of defense witnesses was
not plain error. The court relied upon First and Second Circuit opinions
*

Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School; Blog Editor, EvidenceProf Blog:
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/. I would like to thank Daniel Garramone for his diligent
research assistance.
1
CHUCK KLOSTERMAN, SEX, DRUGS, AND COCOA PUFFS: A LOW CULTURE MANIFESTO 132 (2004)
(link).
2
549 F.3d 1162, 1173–75 (8th Cir. 2008) (link); see Posting of Colin Miller to EvidenceProf Blog,
It’s No Fun Being An Illegal Alien: Eighth Circuit Finds No Plain Error In Magistrate’s Questions
About Witnesses’ Immigration Status, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/12/courtinterroga.html (Dec. 23, 2008) (link).
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that found that the way individuals enter this country is relevant to their
character for truthfulness.3 In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit also acknowledgedbut was ultimately unpersuaded byan analogous Eleventh Circuit decision.4 The Eleventh Circuit found that a district court
erred when it allowed the State to question three defense witnesses about a
letter written by the defendant/appellant, which proposed an adulterous liaison, because the letter did ―not directly relate to the Appellant's truthfulness
and honesty.‖5 The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion was in line with precedent
from across the country, which generally holds that witnesses cannot be
impeached through acts of misconduct unless such acts bear directly on
their truth-telling capacity; evidence that a witness has engaged in unlawful
trespass, the act most similar to entering this country illegally, cannot be
used to impeach the witness under such cases.6
This Essay argues that courts err when finding that witnesses can have
their character for honesty impeached through cross-examination regarding
their immigration statuses. First, immigration status, in and of itself, does
not directly bear upon (dis)honesty. Second, even if immigration status
does have sufficient bearing on witness honesty, the probative value of immigration interrogation is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice that it introduces. Finally, if an attorney seeks to impeach a witness based upon his immigration status or his alleged commission of some
immigration-related crime, such as fraudulently obtaining documentation,
the witness should be able to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
I. IMPEACHMENT’S REACH
Unless a witness has been convicted of a certain category of crime, his
character for honesty generally may only be impeached through opinion and
reputation testimony and not through testimony concerning specific instances of (mis)conduct. For instance, after a defendant testifies in his trial
for a crime such as arson or assault, the State could call a witness to testify
that he has been the defendant’s neighbor for ten years and that (1) in his
opinion, the defendant is a liar and/or that (2) the defendant has a reputation
in the neighborhood for being a liar. The prosecution witness could not,
however, testify about those acts that constitute the basis for his opinion. In
other words, if this prosecution witness thinks the defendant is a liar because he believes or has knowledge that the defendant committed embezzlement, the witness is nevertheless prohibited from testifying concerning
this specific instance of misconduct.
3

Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d at 1174.
Id.
5
United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006) (link).
6
See, e.g., Speers v. Univ. of Akron, 196 F. Supp. 2d 551, 558 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (link); State v.
Gaytan, 972 P.2d 356, 358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (link).
4
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Federal Rules of Evidence 608(a) and (b) explain this dichotomy. In
relevant part, Rule 608(a) states that ―[t]he credibility of a witness may be
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation . . .
.‖7 Conversely, Rule 608(b) begins by stating that in ―attacking or supporting the witness’s character for truthfulness [specific instances of a witness’s
conduct], other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence.‖8
But Rule 608(b) goes on to state that:
[I]n the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness
or untruthfulness, [specific instances of conduct may] be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the
witness being cross-examined has testified.9
In other words, if defense counsel responded to the prosecution witness
by calling its own witness to testify that, in his opinion, the embezzling defendant is honest, the State could ask that witness on cross-examination
whether he knew or had heard that the defendant committed embezzlement.
Pursuant to the Rule, however, the State remains unable to prove the act in
question through extrinsic evidence (in other words, with evidence from
another witness or document); it is bound by the witness’s response.
Moreover, once the defendant’s character is at issue, the State may ask
the defendant directly whether he committed embezzlement. The problem
with this tactic is that Rule 608(b) ends by cautioning: ―[t]he giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as
a waiver of the accused’s or the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination
when examined with respect to matters that relate only to character for
truthfulness.‖10 Assuming, therefore, that he is not on trial for the embezzlement alleged, the defendant could invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege
if questioned about the matter.11 The defense witness, by contrast, cannot
―plead the Fifth‖ because his testimony about the defendant’s embezzlement would not tend to incriminate him.12
7

FED. R. EVID. 608(a) (link).
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (link).
9
Id. (emphasis added).
10
Id.
11
The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 608 indicates that the last sentence of
Rule 608(b) ―constitutes a rejection of the doctrine of such cases as People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 93
N.E.2d 637 (1950), that any past criminal act relevant to credibility may be inquired into on crossexamination, in apparent disregard of the privilege against self-incrimination.‖
12
Of course, the defense witness could still assert this privilege if asked about acts of embezzlement
that he had committed.
8
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II. IMMIGRATION INTERROGATION
In United States v. Almeida-Perez, the Eighth Circuit case referenced
above, José and Porfirio Almeida-Perez appealed their convictions for being
illegal aliens in possession of firearms transported in interstate commerce.13
They alleged, among other things, that the judge (rather than the prosecutor)
improperly badgered defense witnesses14 concerning the defendants’ immigration statuses.15 The Eighth Circuit denied their appeal, relying upon
―two cases in which unlawful entry into the country or other violation of
immigration laws was considered admissible because relevant to truthfulness.‖16
In addition to the two courts issuing the opinions relied upon by the
Eighth Circuit, many other courts, both state and federal, would have
reached the same conclusion.17 The Supreme Court of Wyoming in Marquez v. State,18 provides one example. In Marquez, Oscar Rodriguez Marquez appealed from first-degree assault and assault and battery convictions,
claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly allowed him to be impeached based upon illegal alien status.19 The court denied his appeal, curtly concluding that Marquez’s status as an illegal alien was probative of his
character for truthfulness and that Marquez had ―not directed us to any legal
authority which would persuade us otherwise.‖20
The Second Circuit in United States v. Cambindo Valencia,21 provides
another example. In Cambindo Valencia, the defendant appealed from his
convictions, which related to a conspiracy to commit narcotics offenses,
claiming, inter alia, that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor
to cross-examine him about whether he had a green card.22 The district
court permitted such interrogation, finding that it bore upon the defendant’s
credibility; the Second Circuit affirmed, simply concluding that the questioning was proper.23
Conversely, other courts, such as the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York,24 have precluded the impeachment of
13

549 F.3d 1162, 1164 (8th Cir. 2008) (link); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (link).
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge may interrogate witnesses. FED. R. EVID. 614(b)
(link). However, this right must be exercised with care so that the judge does not become an advocate.
See, e.g., United States v. Melendez-Rivas, 566 F.3d 41, 50 (1st Cir. 2009) (link).
15
Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d at 1173–75.
16
Id. at 1174.
17
See, e.g., United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 557 (1st Cir. 1999) (link).
18
941 P.2d 22 (Wyo. 1997) (link).
19
Id. at 26. Note that Wyoming Rule of Evidence 608(b) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence
608(b). WYO. R. EVID. 608(b) (link).
20
Marquez, 941 P.2d at 26.
21
609 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1979).
22
Id. at 606, 633.
23
Id. at 633–34.
24
Interestingly, this was actually the district court in Cambindo Valencia. Id. at 606.
14
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witnesses based upon their immigration statuses because of the lack of an
established link between such status and credibility.25 According to these
courts, individuals enter the United States for a variety of reasons and under
a variety of circumstances. Thus, ―[a]n individual’s status as an alien, legal
or otherwise, . . . does not entitle [the government] to brand him a liar.‖26
Still other courts have held that a witness cannot be impeached solely based
upon his status as an illegal alien, but may be impeached if the witness has
committed some immigration-related crime, such as falsifying his identity.27
III. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER
To determine which courts are acting correctly, we must consider the
types of conduct typically covered by Rule 608(b). As the text of the Rule
reveals, attorneys may cross-examine witnesses only regarding acts that are
probative of (un)truthfulness.28 Although courts vary somewhat in enumerating what those acts are, many courts, including the Second and Eighth
Circuits, hold that Rule 608(b) only permits inquiry into specific acts ―related to crimen falsi, e.g., perjury, subornation of perjury, false statement,
embezzlement, [or] false pretenses‖ that could lead to arrest.29 Most illegal
immigrants enter the country without inspection,30 meaning that the act of
illegal entry is usually not an act relating to crimen falsi because it does not
involve deceit of or false statements to government officials or bodies. It
follows that the opinions in Almeida-Perez and Cambindo Valencia, which
made no reference to the impeached witnesses’ use of lies or deceit to enter
this country, were wrongly rendered because the courts issuing those opinions otherwise only allow impeachment based upon acts of deception.
Some courts have held that Rule 608(b) permits inquiry into a broader
range of acts, such as property crimes. For instance, in State v. Williams,
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee reversed an appellant’s armed
robbery conviction after concluding that the trial judge erred when he precluded the appellant from impeaching a prosecution witness by inquiring in-

25

See Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., 935 F. Supp. 203, 207–08 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (link).
Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 79 (4th Cir. 1989) (link).
27
See, e.g., EEOC v. Bice of Chicago, 229 F.R.D. 581, 583 (N.D. Ill. 2005). According to the
court, it is only such acts of deceit, and not their connection with immigration status, that can be elicited
during cross-examination. See id.
28
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
29
United States v. Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1987) (link); see Martin v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8381(RLE), 1998 WL 575183, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 1998) (construing
Rule 608(b) narrowly in accordance with United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1977)).
30
See, e.g., Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 332 n.43 (2005).
26
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to an act of larceny the witness had allegedly committed.31 The court simply found that ―[l]arceny is a bad act constituting dishonesty.‖32
Even the courts that read Rule 608 broadly, however, find that trespass,
the act most similar to entering the country illegally,33 is not an act involving dishonesty or false statement. Accordingly, they hold such activity is
beyond the scope of Rule 608(b). To wit, in State v. Philpott, a Tennessee
trial court found that ―[c]riminal trespass is not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement.‖34 Later, recognizing the similarity between illegally
entering this country and trespassing, the same Tennessee appellate court
that found larceny to be a crime of dishonesty relied upon Philpott in finding that a trial court properly precluded a defendant from interrogating a
witness regarding his illegal work status.35 Conversely, no court has explained how immigration status is a proper subject for impeachment while
trespassing is not, nor has any court provided anything more than a cursory
comment ―to support the conclusion that the status of being an illegal alien
impugns one’s credibility.‖36 This lack of sound reasoning is particularly
disturbing given that there are reasons even beyond the plain language of
Rule 608(b) for excluding inquires into a witness’s illegal alien status.
IV. DIVIDE AND PREJUDICE
Even if cross-examination regarding a witness’s immigration status
was sufficiently relevant on the issue of (un)truthfulness under Rule 608(b),
a court would still have to foreclose such inquiry if: (1) its probative value
were substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Rule 403,
and/or (2) it were necessary to protect the witness from harassment or undue embarrassment under Rule 611(a).37 Indeed, in Almeida-Perez, the
Eighth Circuit acknowledged on the one hand that ―the relevance of an im31

645 S.W.2d 258, 259, 260 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (link). Tennessee has expressly adopted
Federal Rule of Evidence 608. See id. at 260 (citing State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385 (Tenn. 1976)).
32
Id. at 260.
33
Indeed, in 2005, a New Hampshire sheriff began applying a criminal trespass law to illegal aliens
because they trespassed according to the plain language of the law. See Teresa A. Miller, A New Look at
Neo-Liberal Economic Policies and the Criminalization of Undocumented Migration, 61 SMU L. REV.
171, 181 n.67 (2008). Although the trial court in the New Hampshire case ultimately dismissed the suit
because it found the State’s interpretation of the law unconstitutionally usurped the Federal Government’s power to regulate immigration, the New Hampshire example evidences how closely the two
crimes are associated. Id. at 181 (citing State v. Barros-Batistele, No. 05-CR-1474 (D.N.H. Aug. 12,
2005)).
34
882 S.W.2d 394, 403 n.16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (link).
35
State v. Hughey, No. W2004-01074-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2000734, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App.
July 18, 2006) (―The state compares an illegal work status to criminal trespass, which this court has
stated does not involve dishonesty.‖) (link).
36
See Mischalski v. Ford Motor Co., 935 F. Supp. 203, 207–08 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (link) (―[Plaintiff]
has cited no authority, and the court is aware of none, to support the conclusion that the status of being
an illegal alien impugns one’s credibility.‖).
37
See FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s note (link).
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migration violation to character for truthfulness is at the least debatable,‖
and on the other that ―the use of such evidence is fraught with the danger of
prejudice to a defendant by introducing the possibility of invidious discrimination on the basis of alienage.‖38 Although the Eighth Circuit ultimately
found that the immigration interrogation in the case before it navigated the
Rule 403 tightrope,39 it should not have done so based upon the tendency of
such questioning to divide and prejudice jurors against the illegal alien.40
In making its decision that immigration interrogation is not reversible
error, the Eighth Circuit relied on precedent from the First and Second Circuits. The First Circuit case, United States v. Cardales, is a 1999 opinion in
which the appellate court found that the district court did not err by allowing the prosecution to impeach the defendant’s character based on its interrogation into his unlawful entry into Puerto Rico.41 That opinion failed to
reference Rule 403. The Eighth Circuit thus would have been better served
relying upon the First Circuit’s 2004 opinion in United States v. AmayaManzanares because, unlike Cardales, Amaya-Manzanares actually addressed the prejudicial effect of immigration interrogation.42
Amaya-Manzanares illustrates the unfair prejudicial effect of immigration interrogation. The Amaya-Manzanares court reversed a defendant’s
conviction for false use of a green card, finding that the district court erred
by failing to consider such effect under the Rule 403 balancing test before
allowing the prosecution to cross-examine him regarding his unlawful entry
into the United States.43 In reversing, the First Circuit acknowledged that
Amaya’s unlawful entry was relevant to the question of whether the green
card was false because such entry would make ―it more likely that the card
is false than it would be without evidence of such entry; after all, an unlawful entrant would have use for a false green card, while a lawful entrant
would have a far better chance of qualifying for a valid card.‖44 Nonetheless, the court found that ―[n]o sensible judge would be likely to let in the
unlawful entry evidence to show falsity‖45 because, among other things:
Proof of Amaya’s unlawful entry is prejudicial in the sense
intended by Rule 403. This is not because it hurts
Amaya—all relevant evidence by the government does
that—but because it introduces a factor into the case that

38

United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1174 (8th Cir. 2008) (link).
See id.
40
See, e.g., Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 177 P.3d 769, 774 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (―The issue of
immigration status is divisive and prejudicial.‖) (link).
41
168 F.3d 548, 557 (1st Cir. 1999) (link).
42
377 F.3d 39, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2004) (link).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 43.
45
Id. (emphasis added).
39
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might encourage the jury to dislike or disapprove of the defendant independent of the merits.46
Some courts also have found that immigration interrogation violates
Rule 403 and/or Rule 611(a) when the party impeached is a civil plaintiff.
For example, one case in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York proscribed a defendant-employer from inquiring into
the immigration status of a former employee who sued the company for
employment discrimination.47 In so doing, the court affirmed the findings
of a magistrate judge who had concluded that the probative value of such
interrogation would be substantially outweighed by the harm it would cause
by ―discouraging illegal alien workers from litigating unlawful discrimination and other employment-related claims for fear that [being forced to]
publicly disclos[e] their unlawful presence in this country would subject
them to deportation proceedings . . . .‖48
Other opinions illustrate the divisive nature of immigration interrogation. For instance, in Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, an undocumented immigrant brought a personal injury action against a scaffolding contractor, and
the trial court allowed the defendant to question the plaintiff and his brother
regarding the plaintiff’s immigration status at length.49 The Court of Appeals of Washington deemed this decision to be erroneous, concluding that
―[t]he issue of immigration status is divisive and prejudicial.‖50 Because
immigration interrogation is lacking in probative value and has this tendency to divide and prejudice jurors, courts should preclude it, even if it is warranted under Rule 608(a).
V. IMMIGRATION INCRIMINATION
Although most illegal immigrants enter this country without engaging
in acts that might be construed as constituting crimen falsi, in some cases,
immigrants do illegally enter this country through the use of some type of
deceit or false statement; in other cases, immigrants not only enter this
country illegally, but also commit some further immigration-related crime
that has direct bearing upon their honesty. For instance, in the previously
mentioned Marquez opinion, the defendant not only entered the country illegally but also used a false Social Security number.51 Although in one
sense such acts of crimen falsi present a stronger argument for impeachment than the bare act of entering the country illegally under Rule 608(b),
46

Id. at 45.
Avila-Blum v. Casa De Cambio Delgado, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 190, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
48
Id. The court also denied the defendants’ motion to set aside a protective order barring inquiry by
the defendants into the plaintiff’s immigration status. Id.
49
177 P.3d 769, 774 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (link).
50
Id.
51
Marquez v. State, 941 P.2d 22, 26 (Wyo. 1997) (link).
47
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the interrogator faces a common obstacle under the Rule in any of the
above-mentioned scenarios: the Fifth Amendment. If an attorney or judge
seeks to impeach a witness based upon his immigration status or his alleged
commission of an immigration-related crime of dishonesty (and that witness
is not the subject of a deportation proceeding or a criminal defendant facing
charges for one of those alleged crimes),52 the witness should53 be able to
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Rule
608(b) ends by cautioning that ―the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused’s
or the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only to character for truthfulness.‖54
When asked about his immigration status or one of these honestyrelated crimes, an illegal alien should be able to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination55 because his response would
create a ―real and appreciable‖ hazard of incrimination and prosecution that
is not ―so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence
his conduct.‖56 Indeed, in an Advisory Opinion issued on January 30, 2009,
the Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee instructed judges not to inquire into a defendant’s immigration status at either a bail or sentencing hearing because a defendant who entered the country illegally can be subject to
criminal penalties, triggering the Fifth Amendment privilege.57
CONCLUSION
As the Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee noted in its recent Advisory Opinion, ―[i]t is public knowledge that there are millions of illegal
aliens in the United States and that the issues arising from that fact are controversial, high-profile, and perceived by members of the public as involving national origin, race, and socioeconomic status.‖58 This Essay opened
by asking whether a prospective juror should trust an illegal alien less than
an adulterer. According to courts allowing for immigration interrogation,
the illegal alien is less deserving of a juror’s trust. But are these decisions
based on the fact that immigration is a hot-button issue, or are they based

52

See Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 441 (2d Cir. 2008) (link).
As discussed in the paragraphs infra, as a legal matter it seems clear that witnesses undergoing
impeachment based on their immigration statuses can, in fact, invoke the Fifth Amendment. See infra
notes 54–57 and accompanying text. Practically, however, it seems unlikely the witness will be aware
she can do so.
54
FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (link).
55
See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment applies to non-resident aliens on trial in the United States) (link).
56
See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599–600 (1896) (link).
57
Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 2008-43 (2009), available at
http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/opinions/2000s/2008_43.pdf (link).
58
Id.
53
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upon illegal immigrants actually being less trustworthy than those who have
committed adultery, trespass, and other acts held to be non-deceitful?
Data shows that most illegal immigrants come to this country to work
and to reunify their families.59 You are a juror. The lawyer’s crossexamination of a first witness implies, ―Be careful of that guy. He is an illegal alien. He is trying to provide for and pull together his family.‖ The
lawyer’s cross-examination of a second witness implies, ―Be careful of that
guy. He cheats on his wife. He is tearing his family apart.‖ Which of these
two people do you trust less?

59

Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 562 & n.17 (1996).

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/6/

299

